This paper derives a government's optimal tax audit policy when taxpayers hold different beliefs about the likelihood of a tax audit. When audits are inexpensive, differences in perceived audit risk lead to stricter optimal auditing in equilibrium. If audits are relatively costly, heterogeneity in audit perceptions lowers the equilibrium audit intensity. Except when beliefs are near-identical throughout the population, both tax evasion and honest reporting occur in equilibrium. A welfare analysis shows a non-monotonic, U-shaped relationship between perception heterogeneity and social welfare. High levels of social welfare are associated with very homogeneous or very heterogeneous populations. Moderately heterogeneous taxpayer populations are associated with lower levels of social welfare.
Introduction
At its core, tax evasion is a bet on escaping detection, for being found out typically leaves the evader worse off than the honest taxpayer. Only undetected tax evasion attains the evader's goal: paying fewer taxes. But just how likely is detection? In this paper, we argue that people differ in their answer to this question, due to heterogeneous perceptions of audit risk.
Such heterogeneity is well in line with the observation that people tend to disagree in many situations requiring an assessment of risky prospects, be they investments, elections, driving a car, or travel planning, to name but a few obvious examples. Tax evasion is a prime example of such a situation. For the purpose of this analysis, we focus on two perceptional biases that capture the essence of heterogeneity in audit perceptions. Taxpayers may be overconfident, thinking that tax evasion will most likely remain undetected. Maybe there is a history of successful evasion. Or a (perceived) knack for hiding money. Or a generally panglossian leaning. 1 Whatever the reason, these intrepid types underestimate the likelihood of being audited by the tax authority. 2 But taxpayers can also be underconfident. Overestimating the true probability of detection, underconfident taxpayers are less prone to evasion than they should be from a purely probabilistic perspective. 3 Being overly cautious may similarly be rooted in personal experience, or, for some people, simply be a general response to uncertainty.
For the purpose of this analyis, we remain agnostic as to which of these biases ultimately prevails and where they come from. Instead, we perform a descriptive analysis that allows for a heterogeneous taxpayer population containing both overconfident and underconfident taxpayers.
We examine how such heterogeneity impacts taxpayer behavior, and how this influences the government's optimal tax audit policy. We then proceed to analyzing the consequences for social welfare in the resulting equilibrium. Following the principal-agent approach to optimal tax auditing pioneered by Reinganum and Wilde (1985) , we find that heterogeneity in audit perceptions substantially changes the government's optimal audit policy. In particular, the tax authority's audit policy choice critically depends on the extent of heterogeneity among taxpayers. If taxpayers are relatively homogeneous in their perception of the audit probability, the government's optimal choice is to induce full compliance, as in the standard model of optimal auditing without heterogeneity. If, however, taxpayers differ significantly in their perception of the audit probability, both evasion and compliance are part of the equilibrium. The equilibrium audit probability may then either be increasing or decreasing with hetero-1 There exists a large literature on the origins of overconfident behavior, a trait which has been shown to affect decision making under numerous circumstances. It is plausible to believe that at least some people also exhibit this bias when filing their tax reports. See Moore and Healy (2008) for a survey on overconfidence.
2 We assume that audits perfectly reveal a taxpayer's true income and use the terms "audit" and "detection" interchangeably throughout the paper.
3 See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) , especially p.1431, for this often-voiced conundrum in the literature on tax evasion. geneity, depending on how costly tax audits are to the government. If audit costs are low, the equilibrium audit intensity increases with heterogeneity. This is because low audit costs make it relatively attractive, in welfare terms, to catch tax evaders, whose contribution to social welfare upon detection is the fines they pay less the cost of audit. But catching tax evaders with a high probability requires auditing with a high probability. Now, if taxpayers are relatively homogeneous and do not stray too far from the true audit probability, such high audit probabilities will induce full compliance, thus invalidating the opportunity of catching and fining evaders with a high likelihood. But when the extent of heterogeneity is large, some taxpayers will evade taxes even at very high audit probabilities, due to misperception. Then the equilibrium audit probability increases in the extent of heterogeneity, because heterogeneity allows detecting and fining evaders with a high likelihood without inducing too much honesty in the taxpayer population. Matters are different when audits are relatively costly to the government. Then the government's main tradeoff is between inducing honesty among taxpayers on the one hand, and economizing on audit costs on the other hand. Stricter auditing induces a higher share of taxpayers to report honestly as well as increasing the expected audit cost. Perception heterogeneity weakens the first, honesty-inducing, effect, but leaves the second, audit-cost-increasing, effect unaffected. When heterogeneity in audit perceptions is large, an increase in the audit intensity will lead to a smaller corresponding increase in the share of honest taxpayers than it would have if taxpayers were more homogeneous. And yet the increase in expected audit cost as a result of stricter auditing remains unchanged. When audit costs are high, a very heterogeneous taxpayer population is therefore associated with auditing less stricly in equilibrium.
We also consider the welfare effects of heterogeneity in audit perceptions, and find a nonmonotonic, U-shaped relationship. Small levels of heterogeneity unambiguously decrease social welfare in equilibrium. That is because, as mentioned above, small levels of heterogeneity make inducing full compliance the government's optimal choice. As heterogeneity increases, however, inducing full compliance becomes more expensive. It requires a higher audit probability, without changing anyone's reporting behavior. The only welfare effect of more dispersed audit perceptions is thus to conduct more wasteful audits of honest taxpayers, an unambiguous welfare loss. But when the extent of heterogeneity is sufficiently large, a second effect enters to countervail this welfare loss. Working through the equilibrium audit probability, the nature of this second, welfare-enhancing, effect of heterogeneity in audit perceptions depends on the level of audit costs, mirroring the argument presented in the previous paragraph. When audit costs are low, the equilibrium audit intensity increases in the extent of heterogeneity.
For large levels of heterogeneity, this is welfare-enhancing because it allows the tax authority to detect and fine evaders with a high probability without inducing too much honesty. When audit costs are high, the equilibrium audit probability decreases in the extent of heterogeneity. This is welfare-enhancing because it allows economizing on audit costs while still inducing a significant amount of honest tax reporting in the population. This paper is chiefly related to two strands of literature, on the economics of tax evasion and on behavioral biases in economic decision making, a topic which has received ample attention in both economics and psychology. Following the seminal work by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) , a large economic literature has analyzed various aspects of tax evasion. Excellent surveys are provided by Andreoni et al (1998) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) . This paper belongs to a slightly more recent literature on optimal tax auditing, and uses a principal-agent approach with commitment as pioneered by Reinganum and Wilde (1985) . In this class of models, a tax authority first announces and commits to an audit policy, in response to which taxpayers make their tax reports. Other seminal publications in this vein include Scotchmer (1987) , Sanchez and Sobel (1993) , Perez-Castrillo (1997), and MachoStadler and Perez-Castrillo (2002) . For completeness, it should be noted that the optimal auditing literature has also considered models without commitment, for instance by Graetz et al (1986) or Erard and Feinstein (1994) . The present paper is most closely related work by Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1997) , by Caballé and Panadés (2005) , and by Cronshaw and Alm (1995) . Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1997) consider optimal auditing with heterogeneous income sources, which are categorized by an exogenously fixed and commonly known detection probability in case an audit occurs and income of a particular source was evaded. The idea is that some sources of income (say wages and salaries) are much easier to monitor than others (say income from owning a restaurant). However, since the income source is assumed to be observable by the tax authority, and the audit strategy thus made conditional on it, the model of Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1997) does not address heterogeneity along two privately known types, as is the case here. It also assumes, plausibly enough in the case of income sources, that the source of income determines the actual detection probability. In our model, however, it is only the perceptions of the audit probability that vary, while the true audit probability is the same for every evader. Caballé and Panadés (2005) consider a model of two-sided cost uncertainty, introducing a varying, idiosyncratic, and privately known audit cost on the part of auditors and a similarly heterogeneous, privately known cost of suffering a tax inspection on the part of taxpayers. They extend earlier work by Reinganum and Wilde (1988) , who consider a setup with only a varying cost of audit as the private information of tax auditors, about which taxpayers are uncertain. In our model, there is no uncertainty about the cost of audit, which is commonly known to all. The focus of these papers, including also the work by Cronshaw and Alm (1995) , is to explore the impact of taxpayer uncertainty on tax compliance, and what the implications are for the government's audit policy. That is, whether uncertainty about audit policies should be fostered or reduced. In the present work, we abstract from such considerations and instead examine the impact of heterogeneity in audit perceptions itself on optimal auditing by the government, rather like in the work by Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1997) , but with a different and privately known source of heterogeneity. Relevant to but further removed from this paper is a series of fairly recent works applying various non-expected utility approaches to tax compliance. These approaches include ambiguity aversion (Snow and Warren 2005) , prospect theory (Yaniv 1999, al-Nowaihi and Dahmi 2007) , rank dependent expected utility (Arcand and Graziosi 2005, Eide 2002) , and reference dependence (Bernasconi and Zanardi 2004) . A recent survey by Hashimzade et al (2013) summarizes work undertaken along these lines. Although these studies do not concern themselves with optimal auditing, and, by using different notions of utility, stray quite far from the standard expected utility approach employed in this paper, they aim to address puzzles not unlike the ones motivating this work, and should thus be included for completeness.
A second field of research this paper builds on is the literature on probability misperceptions. To focus the argument, we use for the purpose of this paper the terms overconfidence as in overestimating the likelihood of a good outcome (non-detection) and underconfidence as in overestimating the likelihood of a bad outcome (tax audit), although both terms have been used to describe different (but related) things throughout the literature, as the survey by Moore and Healy (2008) illustrates. Overconfidence is a well documented bias in human behavior, economic and otherwise. It has been drawn upon to explain entrepreneurial excess-entry (Camerer and Lovallo 1999) , excessive M&A activity by managers (Malmendier and Tate 2008) , overly high rates of stock trading (Odean 1998) , and the politics of warfare (Howard 1983 , Johnson 2004 . People also seem to be overconfident in various aspects of their daily lives. Students overestimate their exam-performance (Clayson 2005) , workers overestimate their job-performance relative to colleagues (Zenger 1992) , and drivers overestimate their driving skills (Svenson 1981) . It seems plausible that at least some taxpayers are thus overconfident when it comes to their tax evasion strategies, overestimating their ability to successfully claim deductions and escape punishment for evasion. Overconfidence has also recently found a wide range of applications in traditional issues of applied economic theory. Sandroni and Squintani (2007) examine the effect on insurance contracts when a (varying) share of the population underestimate their risk category and find that the effects of overconfidence depend both qualitatively and quantitatively on the prevalence of overconfidence in the population. Further examples of such applications are studies on optimal pricing with overconfident consumers by Grubb (2009) and Eliaz and Spiegler (2008) and on the effect of managerial overconfidence on corporate investment by Malmendier and Tate (2005) and on corporate innovation (Hirshleifer et al 2012) . De la Rosa (2011) considers a classic moral-hazard model along the lines of Holmstrom (1979) , but allows for agent overconfidence regarding the relationship between managerial effort and the likelihood of success. Spinnewijn (2014, forthcoming) considers the optimal design of unemployment insurance when insurees overestimate the likelihood of finding work after a job loss. A survey of overconfidence and its contract-theoretic implications is contained in Koszegi (2014, forthcoming) . The idea that individuals may also be underconfident, or overly cautious, seems particularly pertinent in the context of tax evasion. A recurring puzzle in the literature on tax evasion is why people evade so little, given the relatively low detection probability and fine rates observed in reality.
As Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002, p.1431) note, "the intriguing question becomes why people pay taxes rather than why people evade." Although various explanations have been proposed to address this conundrum (for more details, see the surveys by Andreoni et al 1998 , Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002 and Hashimzade et al 2013 , one simple approach is to infer that some taxpayers overestimate the true audit probability, and therefore evade less than what a model based solely on this probability would suggest. Although ultimately an empirical question beyond the scope of this paper, we take the large number of existing studies in both directions as an indication that both overconfidence and underconfidence are likely present in the taxpayer population. Rather than passing judgement on the direction of the perception bias, we therefore examine a population that exhibits heterogeneity in its perception of the audit probability. This approach is related to analyzing heterogeneous risk perceptions in insurance models, as a recent paper by Spinnewijn (2013) has done to explain heterogeneity in insurance choices. Indeed, we agree with Spinnewijn's (2013, p.606) statement that "people have very different beliefs about the risks they face," and take this observation as a starting point for the present analysis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the formal model. Section 3.1 derives taxpayers' best-response tax reporting choices. Section 3.2 analyzes the tax authority's optimal audit policy. Section 3.3 considers the implications of heterogeneous audit perceptions for social welfare. Section 4 concludes.
Model
Consider a tax evasion game between a government and a population of taxpayers. In the first stage of the game, the government decides on an audit policy with the objective of maximizing social welfare. Given their privately known income and their belief about the government's audit policy, taxpayers then file a tax report. This report is subsequently audited according to the previously specified policy. Income is denoted by y ∈ {0, 1} and can be either low or high. We normalize the low income to y = 0 and the high income to y = 1. Taxpayers know their income, but the government learns a taxpayer's true income only upon audit, and is otherwise dependent on a tax report r ∈ {0, 1} made by the taxpayer in assessing its taxes. 5 The distribution of income is common knowledge and follows P(y = 1) = ν , P(y = 0) = 1 − ν .
Taxpayers also differ in their belief about the government's audit policy. Denoting this probability belief by θ, a taxpayer believes the probability of a tax audit is given by
where is a measure of misperception uniformly distributed on [−a, a] around the true audit probability p. 6 The heterogeneity parameter a ≥ 0 determines the extent to which taxpayers differ in their perception of the government's audit policy. Negative values of mean a taxpayer underestimates the risk of detection, for instance due to overconfidence or optimism.
The converse bias of underconfidence or undue caution with regard to tax audits is the case when > 0. To focus the analysis on heterogeneity itself rather than on perceptional biases in one or the other direction, we assume that misperception is symmetrically distributed around the true audit probability p, so that on average, taxpayers are correct about the government's policy.
Government
In the initial stage of the game, the government chooses an audit probability p :
for each possible tax report, so as to maximize expected social welfare. 7 Denoting expected welfare by W , we obtain a social welfare function of the general form
where Π denotes taxpayers' expected payoffs and T is expected net tax revenue composed of taxes and fines net of audit cost, which is a constant c > 0. We follow the convention of assuming λ > 0 to account for the shadow value of public funds, usually assumed to be larger than one. 8 To simplify the ensuing analysis, let us state right away a classic result in the literature on optimal auditing that also holds in this framework.
Lemma 1. It is never optimal to audit a high income report. Every optimal audit policy therefore satisfies p(1) = 0.
As will become clear, taxpayers have no incentive to overreport income, and so high reports (r = 1) will be filed only by honest, high-income taxpayers. Auditing them would not produce additional revenue, or change anyone's behavior. Since audits are costly, auditing a high report therefore constitutes mere waste. In what follows, we shall hence refer to the probability p (0) that a low income report is audited simply as p. Let us now proceed to the analysis of the tax evasion game presented in this section.
Analysis
Solving the game backwards, we begin with the decisions made by the taxpayer and then characterize the government's optimal audit policy.
Tax reporting
Given income y and their belief θ about the government's audit policy, taxpayers choose a tax report r to maximize their expected payoff. This payoff is composed of their income net of the expected tax payment, which includes expected fines for evasion. 9 The government does not pay taxpayers for overstating their income. Low-income individuals therefore always file a truthful tax report. High-income taxpayers face a classic tax evasion gamble. Honest reporting implies, with certitude, a tax payment of exogenous size τ ∈ [0, 1]. Filing a low 7 We focus strictly on the choice of an optimal tax audit policy, and treat the tax rate τ as given. See Appendix A.2 for an analysis of the impact of τ in this model.
8 See Laffont and Tirole (1993) for a discussion and application of this concept in the theory of regulation. 9 As in Becker (1968) , maximum fines are optimal in this setup. We therefore assume that the government sets fines optimally and a tax evader loses her entire income upon detection.
report, on the other hand, entails losing one's entire income with (perceived) probability θ, but paying no taxes at all with the converse probability, 1−θ. Formally, high-income taxpayers thus solve
An honest high-income taxpayer reports r = 1 and receives her statutory net income
A tax evader reports r = 0 and expects her payoff to be
Tax evasion is thus a taxpayer's preferred choice if and only if
meaning the gain from evasion (tax savings τ ) exceeds the expected punishment for evasion (a fine of size 1 payable with perceived probability θ of a tax audit).
Recall from above that taxpayers differ in their perception θ of the audit probability, unobservable to the government. Rewriting the evasion condition (4) using θ = p + , we obtain that taxpayers evade whenever the true audit probability p is low enough relative to the gains of evasion τ adjusted by the individual perception bias . Let us now formally state taxpayers' best-response tax reports in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. [Best-response tax reports]
Given any audit probability p of a low report, income y ∈ {0, 1}, and perception type θ = p + , a taxpayer's best response tax report in stage 1 of the game is given by
Follows directly from (4) and the fact that taxpayers do not overreport income.
In essence, Proposition 1 states that low-income taxpayers always report honestly, whereas high-income taxpayers report honestly only when the audit probability is sufficiently high, and otherwise evade taxes. Note that we follow the literature in assuming that when taxpayers are indifferent regarding their expected payoffs, they report honestly. In what follows, we furthermore assume that the maximum extent of misperception among taxpayers is bounded.
That is, we assume 0 ≤ τ − a ≤ τ + a ≤ 1 , so that it is possible to induce honesty in the most overconfident taxpayer and that there exist audit probabilities low enough for the most underconfident taxpayer to evade taxes. This assumption focuses the analysis on a realistic range of misperceptions. No taxpayer is so overconfident as to evade even when audits are certain, or so underconfident as to report honestly even if the audit probability equals zero.
Let us now proceed to analyzing the tax authority's audit policy choice.
Audit policy choice
In the initial stage of the game, the government chooses an audit probability p for low reports (r = 0). Bearing mind that high reports (r = 1) are never audited according to Lemma 1, the choice of p fully determines a tax audit policy in this setup. As described in Section 2, the government maximizes an additive social welfare function that weighs expected taxpayer income at unity and expected tax revenue at 1 + λ > 1 to account for the shadow value of public funds. The government's problem can be written as
Expected social welfare consists of three terms, associated with the two different income types and their respective reporting behavior. Since all low-income earners report their low income truthfully, we need to distinguish between honest and dishonest reporting behavior for the high-income earners only.
The first term describes the expected social welfare arising from low-income taxpayers (y = 0), who make up a share 1−ν of the population. If they are not audited, their welfare contribution is zero. If low-income types are audited (w.p. p), however, the government has to pay the audit cost c > 0 without generating any revenue, and so this term enters negatively in expectation.
The first term reflects the welfare cost of mistaking an honest low-income taxpayer for a tax evader.
Now consider the two terms relating to high-income taxpayers, who make up a share v of the population. They will either evade or report honestly, depending on the audit policy p and their audit perception type θ. Q(p) denotes the share of tax evaders among high-income earners as a function of the audit probability p. Let us first describe the respective welfare contributions of the evading and honest high-income taxpayers, and subsequently elaborate further on the shape of Q(p).
The second line of the social welfare function gives, in square brackets, the expected welfare contribution of a high-income tax evader. If there is no audit (w.p. 1 − p), this equals 1, the undetected evader's private income. If there is an audit (w.p. p), however, private income is zero due to maximum fines. Social welfare is then the tax revenue of size 1, valued at 1 + λ, minus the cost c of a tax audit.
In third line of the above expression, we find in square brackets the welfare contribution term of the honest high-income taxpayer. Since high-income reports are not audited, this term does not contain the audit probability p or audit costs c. Instead, it sums up the taxpayer income of 1 minus tax payment τ and the tax revenue τ valued at the shadow value of public funds (1 + λ).
Now consider Q(p), the share of tax evaders in the high-income population. Recall from Proposition 1 that tax evasion occurs when the audit probability is sufficiently small relative to the gains from evasion (tax savings τ ) adjusted by a taxpayer's perception bias . Specifically, a high-income taxpayer underreports income if p < τ − . Equivalently, evasion occurs if a taxpayer's random perception component is small enough, or < τ − p ≡˜ . For a uniformly distributed perception bias, ∼ U (−a, a) , we obtain for the share of tax evaders that
The least confident taxpayer in the population has a bias of = +a, meaning she overestimates the true audit probability by a. Since evasion occurs when p < τ − , an audit probability smaller than τ − a means that even the most underconfident high-income taxpayer still considers evasion optimal, implying that all high-income earners evade, or Q(p) = 1. If, on the other hand, the audit probability is sufficiently large to induce honesty in even the most overconfident taxpayer, characterized by = −a, we have the converse result that all highincome taxpayers report truthfully, or Q(p) = 0. For any audit probability located between these extremes of full evasion and full compliance, a share
of high-income taxpayers will underreport income, while the converse share 1 − τ −p+a 2a
chooses to report honestly. The following figure illustrates the share of tax evaders among high-income earners as a function of the audit probability. When setting its audit policy to maximize social welfare, the government faces a three-way tradeoff between minimizing audit costs (requiring a low audit intensity), inducing honest tax reporting (requiring a high audit intensity), and catching evaders (requiring the audit intensity to be high enough to make detection likely, but low enough so as to still find some misreporting in the population). Detecting and fining some evaders, rather than inducing complete honesty, may be optimal. This is because an evader turns over her entire income to the government upon detection, where it is valued at the shadow value of public funds 1 + λ. An honest taxpayer, on the other hand, only turns over her statutory tax payment τ to the government, and keeps a net income of size 1 − τ in private hands, where it is valued at unity. Whether or not tax evaders, via fines, contribute more to expected welfare than honest taxpayers depends on the audit costs c and the likelihood of detection p. Let us now formally characterize the tax authority's optimal response to this tradeoff.
Proposition 2. [Equilibrium audit policy]
a) Suppose c < λν. Then the equilibrium audit probability of a low report is uniquely given Full compliance is achieved setting p * = τ + a, which is required to induce honesty in even the most overconfident taxpayer, whose perception of the audit probability is θ = p − a. Since all other taxpayers are less confident than the most overconfident one, p = τ + a entails that they, too, will report truthfully. Because p * = τ + a already induces full compliance, auditing any stricter would not change anyone's reporting behavior. At the same time, audit costs would increase due to more wasteful audits of low-income taxpayers, who do not generate any revenue. No audit probability higher than τ + a can therefore be optimal. Now consider the case where heterogeneity in audit perceptions is relatively large, i.e. a > a L , meaning taxpayers differ significantly in their assessment of the true audit probability. Then the tax authority chooses an interior audit probability in the sense that both tax evasion and tax compliance are part of the equilibrium. That is, the equilibrium share of tax evaders in the high-income population satisfies Q(p * ) ∈ (0, 1). When heterogeneity is large, the most overconfident taxpayers severely underestimate the true audit probability. Inducing full compliance is thus too expensive relative to the additional welfare cost of stricter auditing.
Lastly, part b) of Proposition 2 states for completeness the well-known result that if audit costs are sufficiently large, it is optimal not to audit at all, meaning p * = 0.
The focus of this paper is to examine the impact of heterogeneity in audit perceptions on the government's optimal audit policy choice. Let us formally state the relationship between the equilibrium audit intensity p * and heterogeneity a in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. [Impact of heterogeneous audit perceptions on equilibrium auditing]
a) Suppose a < a L . Then the equilibrium audit probability increases in a.
b) Suppose a > a L . Then the equilibrium audit probability increases in a if and only if audit costs are sufficiently low. Formally,
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 2.
First, consider the impact of heterogeneous audit perceptions when the extent of heterogeneity is small, i.e. when a < a L . From Proposition 2a), we know that inducing full compliance via p * = τ + a is optimal. As heterogeneity a increases, the most overconfident taxpayer's perception of the true audit probability, θ = p−a, decreases. So inducing honest tax reporting by the most overconfident taxpayer requires a higher audit probability as a increases. We therefore immediately see that the equilibrium audit probability increases in the extent of heterogeneity.
If the extent of heterogeneity is large, i.e. when a > a L , heterogeneous audit perceptions can either increase the equilibrium audit intensity, or decrease it, depending on how costly tax audits are to the government. To analyze the effects of a change in heterogeneity a on the optimal audit probability, it is instructive to look at the first order condition that determines the optimal interior audit probability p * . This condition is obtained by taking the partial derivate of the social welfare function with respect to p, and is formally given by
The left-hand side of equation (6) describes the marginal gain in social welfare from stricter auditing, while the right-hand side describes the marginal welfare cost of auditing. The uniquely optimal interior audit probability p * satisfying equation (6) exactly balances the marginal welfare gain and marginal welfare cost of tax auditing.
A change in the heterogeneity of audit perceptions has three effects, visible in equation (6).
First, the marginal gain in social welfare from a higher share of honest taxpayers ( ν 2a λτ ) is lowered if a increases. This is because a larger support [−a, a] of possible audit perceptions reduces the marginal increase in the share of honest taxpayers in response to stricter auditing. 10 We see immediately from the first order condition (6) that when audit cost c is relatively large, this effect of lowering marginal revenue is the dominant effect of an increase 10 The marginal increase in the share of honest taxpayers in response to stricter auditing corresponds the slope of the graph in Figure 2 . Increasing the support a flattens this slope.
in heterogeneity. It follows that when audit costs are large, an increase in the support of audit perceptions decreases the audit probability chosen in equilibrium. This case is shown on the right-hand side panel of Figure 3 below. Intuitively, large audit costs imply that the welfare contribution of evaders, p(λ − c), is relatively small. The main tradeoff in choosing an optimal audit policy is therefore between inducing honesty among high-income types and conducting wasteful audits on low-income types. As a increases, the honesty-inducing effect of stricter auditing is lowered, while the marginal cost of conducting wasteful audits remains unaffected by a. Consequently, then, as audit perceptions become more heterogeneous and hence inducing honesty more expensive, the optimal response for the tax authority is to audit less strictly.
Second, a change in a, the heterogeneity of audit perceptions, affects the marginal gain from detecting more evaders in response to stricter auditing, ν τ −p+a 2a (λ−c). 11 If the audit probability p increases, more evaders are caught and fined in expectation. How this effect is impacted by a change in a depends on how a changes the share of tax evaders, Q = τ −p+a 2a . We see that Q a < 0 if and only if τ − p > 0. That is, whenever p < τ , meaning the audit probability is sufficiently low for more than half the population to evade, or Q > 1 2 , the result of an increase in a is to lower the share of tax evaders, or Q a < 0. Conversely, if p > τ , less than half the (high-income) population evades, or Q < 1 2 , implying that Q a > 0. This property of symmetric distributions, that majority shares decrease toward the mean when the support expands whereas minority shares increase toward the mean as the support expands, here implies that the effect of an increase in a on the marginal revenue from detecting more evaders can go both ways, depending on how a changes the share of evaders in the population. If an expanded support increases the share of evaders, the marginal revenue from detecting more evaders goes up. If an expanded support decreases the share of evaders, marginal revenue from detecting more evaders goes down.
Third, the marginal welfare cost of having fewer tax evaders as a result of stricter auditing, ν 2a p(λ − c), decreases as a increases. This is because a larger support [−a, a] of audit perceptions lowers the marginal decrease in the share of tax evaders in response to stricter auditing, in analalogy to the first effect described above. A large a means that even at high audit probabilities, there will still be some evasion, by the most overconfident taxpayers.
If audit costs are low enough, specifically if c < ν 2−ν λ, the expected welfare contribution of tax evaders, p(λ − c), is relatively important for expected social welfare. This means the second and third effects described above, namely the marginal gain from catching more evaders and the marginal cost of having fewer evaders, are key in determining the impact of a change in a on the optimal audit probability. In fact, we can show that for such low c, the marginal cost 11 The marginal gain in social welfare from detecting more evaders is composed of the share of evaders in the high-income population, ν τ −p+a 2a
, whose expected welfare contribution is p(λ − c), and the marginal increase in their expected welfare contribution in reponse to stricter auditing, (λ − c).
of stricter auditing due to fewer evaders always decreases by more in reponse to a change in a than does the marginal revenue (which might even increase). This means that if audit costs are low enough, the equilibrium audit intensity increases as heterogeneity a increases. This case is shown in the left-hand side panel of Figure 3 below. Intuitively, when audit costs are low, the government maximizes social welfare by not inducing too much honesty, so as to still detect and fine some evaders. At the same time, detection is higher the higher is the audit probability. A higher a eases this tradeoff between inducing too much honesty and detecting as many evaders as possible. If the spread of perceptions is large, the government makes relatively few evaders report honestly by auditing more strictly. This allows it to audit a still sizable share of very overconfident evaders at a high audit intensity. If audit costs are low, this amounts to a welfare gain to be had from stricter auditing. The following figure illustrates the equilibrium audit probability as a function of heterogeneity in audit perceptions a.
Low audit cost
High audit cost Next, we consider the welfare effects of heterogeneity in audit perceptions.
Welfare and heterogeneous audit perceptions
The effect of heterogeneity in audit perceptions on social welfare is non-monotonic. Equilibrium welfare is U-shaped in the degree of heterogeneity a : Very low and very high levels of a are associated with relatively high equilibrium welfare, whereas intermediate levels of heterogeneity are associated with a low level of social welfare in equilibrium. Let us consider these cases in turn. When heterogeneity is relatively small, or a < a L , we know from the previous section that the tax authority optimally induces full compliance setting p * = τ + a , which is increasing in a. Since there is full compliance as long as a ≤ a L , increasing a in this range does not change anyone's tax reporting behavior, despite the higher audit probability. The only welfare effect of an increase in heterogeneity a, when a is small, is therefore to conduct more wasteful audits of truthful low-income reports filed by low-income taxpayers. Equilibrium welfare thus decreases in the extent of heterogeneity a for small levels of misperception up to a L . This insight makes up part a) of Proposition 3 below. The following figure illustrates equilibrium welfare as a function of the degree of heterogeneity in audit perceptions. Consider now part b) of Proposition 3, which describes the welfare effects of heterogeneity in audit perceptions for larger levels of heterogeneity, i.e. for a > a L . As shown in the previous section, larger levels of a imply that both evasion and honest reporting are part of the equilibrium, i.e. Q(p * ) ∈ (0, 1). Applying the envelope theorem, we find that the change in equilibrium social welfare with respect to heterogeneity is given by
change in share of honest taxp. dif f erence in welf. contributions
Using equation (7), the welfare effects described in Proposition 3b) become evident. Two cases require distinction, namely those of high and low audit costs.
First, suppose audit costs are small, i.e. c < ν 2−ν λ. Recall from Corollary 1 above that small audit costs imply that the equilibrium audit intensity is increasing in the extent of heterogeneity, i.e. ∂p * ∂a > 0. This is because when audit costs are small, the social welfare contribution of tax evaders is relatively large. Since higher heterogeneity allows stricter auditing without inducing too much honesty, an increase in heterogeneity raises the audit intensity chosen in equilibrium. Furthermore, when audit costs are low, we always have p * > τ , meaning a majority of high-income taxpayers reports honestly. 12 As argued above, this implies that an increase in the support of possible audit perceptions decreases the share of honest taxpayers in the population. The first term on the right-hand side of (7) is therefore always negative when audit costs are small. Put differently, an increase in heterogeneity a always increases the share of tax evaders in the population if audit costs are small. This means an increase in a induces a welfare gain when evaders contribute more to expected welfare than honest taxpayers, or λτ − p * (λ − c) < 0, and vice versa. Since the audit probability p * increases in a, this is equivalent to saying that for intermediate levels of a, i.e. a L < a < a H where honest taxpayers always contribute more, an increase in heterogeneity a induces a decrease in social welfare. For high levels of heterogeneity, i.e. a > a H , however, evaders contribute more to social welfare in expectation since their probability of being detected is relatively high in equilibrium, yet they still evade due to high levels of overconfidence. Then, an increase in heterogeneity a causes equilibrium welfare to rise, which explains the U-shaped social welfare curve depicted in Figure 4 above.
Second, consider the case of large audit costs, i.e. c > ν 2−ν λ. From Corollary 1, we know that 12 To see this, note that at a = aL, p * = τ + aL > τ . But for a > aL and small audit costs, we have ∂p * ∂a > 0 by Corollary 1b. So the optimal audit probability always stays above τ . large audit costs imply that the equilibrium audit intensity is decreasing in heterogeneity, because inducing honesty becomes more expensive on the margin as the support of possible audit perceptions increases, while tax evaders contribute relatively little to social welfare.
Indeed, when audit costs are large, the welfare contribution of honest taxpayers always exceeds the expected welfare contribution of tax evaders, or λτ − p * (λ − c) > 0. 13 This means the second term on the right-hand side of equation (7) is always positive. It follows that the effect of an increase in a on equilibrium welfare depends on how the share of honest taxpayers changes with a. That is, on whether the first term on the right hand side of (7) is positive or negative. Honest taxpayers yield more welfare in expectation than evaders. So an increase in heterogeneity a is associated with a welfare gain if the share of honest taxpayers increases due to a ↑, and with a welfare loss if the share of tax evaders increases due to a ↑. Because the audit probability decreases in a, then, intermediate levels of heterogeneity, (a L < a < a H ) are associated with decreasing equilibrium welfare, while large levels of heterogeneity (a > a H ) cause social welfare to rise with heterogeneity in audit perceptions, yielding the U-shaped pattern of social welfare familiar from Figure 4 . This concludes the analysis of the social welfare effects of heterogeneity in audit perceptions.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how heterogeneity in taxpayers' audit perceptions affects tax compliance, the tax authority's audit policy, and social welfare. If taxpayers differ sufficiently in their perception of audit risk, both tax evasion and truthful reporting are part of the equilibrium. This contrasts with the full compliance equilibrium often found in the literature on optimal auditing. In our model, full compliance obtains only when audit perceptions are very homogeneous, close to identical. Moreover, we find that heterogeneity in audit perceptions substantially changes the government's optimal audit policy. The precise nature of this change depends on how costly tax audits are to the government. If audit costs are sufficiently low, heterogeneity in audit perceptions is associated with stricter auditing in equilibrium. Intuitively, this is because low audit costs decrease the cost of detecting and fining evaders, which, if done with a high enough probability, can be welfare-enhancing. But such a high enough audit probability is not optimal when taxpayers are relatively homogeneous, for then it would induce full compliance, defying its purpose of catching and fining tax evaders with a high likelihood. Stricter auditing without inducing "too much" honesty (so as to still detect and fine some evaders) is only possible when taxpayers differ significantly in their audit perceptions, so that there are enough very overconfident taxpayers who evade even at high audit probabilities. If, on the other hand, tax audits are rather costly to the government, heterogeneity 13 To see this, note that at aL, λτ > p * (λ − c). But for a > aL and large audit costs, we have ∂p * ∂a < 0 by Corollary 1b. So this inequality must hold for all a > aL.
in audit perceptions is associated with auditing less strictly in equilibrium. This is because when audit costs are high, the government's main tradeoff is between minimizing audit costs and inducing honesty, rather than focusing on detecting tax evaders. Heterogeneity in audit perceptions, however, weakens the honesty-inducing effect of stricter auditing and thus leads to a lower audit probability in equilibrium. Lastly, we consider the welfare effects of heterogeneous audit perceptions and find a non-monotonic, U-shaped relationship between the extent of heterogeneity and social welfare. Very homogenous or very heterogeneous populations are associated with relatively high levels of social welfare, whereas a moderately heterogeneous population corresponds to a relatively low level of social welfare in equilibrium.
A.1. Interim incentive (in-)compatibility
This paper follows the principal-agent approach to optimal auditing first developed by Reinganum and Wilde (1985) . Characteristic of this class of models is that the tax authority commits to an audit policy before taxpayers file their reports. A point sometimes found wanting in these models 14 is that after taxpayers have filed their reports, the tax authority may want to deviate from its previously announced audit policy. In the standard model of auditing without heterogeneity, where the equilibrium audit probability under commitment induces full compliance, this reconsideration takes an extreme form: after receiving only honest reports, the tax authority would rather not audit at all, because auditing is costly and, at this interim stage, does not change anyone's reporting behavior or generate any revenue. Behavior is not changed because all reports have already been filed and revenue is not generated because all taxpayers have reported truthfully, meaning audits will not generate any fines. In our model, too, the goverment would want to deviate from its commitment audit policy, but with an interesting twist. Instead of not auditing at all after receiving tax reports, the tax authority may want to maximally increase its audit probability and audit with certainty. This occurs when audit costs are sufficiently low. Our model also contains, for sufficiently large audit costs, the standard result that redeciding at an interim stage yields an audit probability of zero. Let us now formally state and derive this result.
Proposition. A.1. [Interim incentive incompatibility]
Suppose that, unbeknownst to taxpayers, the tax authority can deviate from its announced audit policy p * after taxpayers have filed their reports. Then the optimal audit choice at this interim stage is given by
Proof. Suppose the tax authority has announced an audit probability p * according to Proposition 2 and taxpayers have filed their best-response tax reports according to Proposition 1. Now the tax authority may set anew its probability of auditing a low report.
If a ≤ a L , we know from Proposition 2 that inducing full compliance via p * = τ + a is optimal. All taxpayers therefore truthfully report their income, and so, as in the standard model without heterogeneity, auditing is wasteful and the tax authority optimally chooses
The more involved case is when a > a L . Then the equilibrium audit intensity under com-
, gives rise to an equilibrium where both evasion and honest reporting by high-income earners occurs, i.e. where Q(p * ) ∈ (0, 1). A low income report may come from an honest low-income earner or from a high-income tax evader. Using
Bayes' rule, the probability that, given p * , a low-income report was filed by a taxpayer who actually has high income is given by
The government's problem is then equivalent to
Since the objective function is linear in the interim audit probability p, it is seen immediately that a corner solution obtains, and that the solution to this maximization problem is thus given by p = 0 if µλ < c and p = 1 if µλ > c. Using the expressions for p * and Q(p * ) in µ(p * ) then gives the conditions provided in Proposition A.1. This concludes the proof.
A.2. The role of the tax rate τ
Although we confine ourselves to focusing purely on the problem of how to optimally audit taxpayers given an exogeneous tax rate τ , it is obvious that a related question is how to optimally tax them in the first place. Aside from a few exceptions, for instance the seminal paper by Chander and Wilde (1998) , optimal auditing and optimal taxation have usually been treated separately, and it is beyond the scope of the present paper to attempt this challenging integration here. However, a few insights about the role of the tax rate τ emerge from our analysis. We shall first consider the impact of τ on the equilibrium audit probability, and subsequently examine the impact of the tax rate on equilibrium welfare. To focus the analysis, consider the following corollary.
Corollary. A.2 (i) [Impact of τ on equilibrium auditing]
a) The equilibrium audit probability increases in τ , but more so when a > a L than when a ≤ a L .
b) The effect of heterogeneity on the equilibrium audit probability is not impacted by τ .
c) The threshold level of heterogeneity required for an interior audit probability, a L , increases with τ .
Proof. a) When a ≤ a L , we have p * = τ + a and hence Corollary A.2 (i) presents the comparative statics of equilibrium auditing with respect to the tax rate τ . We find that an increase in the tax rate is associated with stricter auditing in equilibrium, suggesting that tax rate and audit probability are complementary policy instruments. Part a) also states that this complementarity is stronger in the equilibrium with only partial compliance due to large heterogeneity (a > a L ) that is a distinguishing feature of our model compared to the standard model without heterogeneity, where full compliance obtains in equilibrium. Part b) of the preceding Corollary shows that the impact of heterogeneity on auditing as described in Corollary 1 is not affected by the tax rate. Finally, we find that the extent of heterogeneity required for the partial compliance equilibrium increases with τ .
Let us now consider the relationship between the tax rate and social welfare. We arrive at two formal results, stated in the following Corollary. 
Then welfare is given by This Corollary shows that as the tax rate τ increases, the level of heterogeneity in audit perceptions that corresponds to a welfare minimum, a H , increases. This means that the higher the tax rate τ , the higher the extent of heterogeneity a required to make further increases in heterogeneity welfare-increasing. In part b), we show that in the full compliance equilibrium, which obtains for very homogeneous populations in our model (a ≤ a L ), setting a maximal tax rate is the welfare optimum. As would be expected due to the complex interactions between optimal taxation and optimal auditing, matters are less tractable when heterogeneity is large and the partial compliance equilibrium obtains. We therefore leave the joint-determination of optimal tax and audit policies in this case for future research.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2
Consider three different ranges of the audit probability p and the respective shape of the social welfare function in these ranges.
First, suppose p ≥ τ + a.
From (5), we know this implies Q = 0, meaning all high-income taxpayers report honestly as the audit probability is sufficiently high. Using Q = 0 in the social welfare function, one obtains
So social welfare is strictly decreasing in p for p ≥ τ + a. The tax authority's equilibrium choice of p will therefore never be higher than τ + a.
Second, suppose p ≤ τ − a.
From (5), we know this implies Q = 1, meaning all high-income taxpayers underreport income because the audit probability is sufficiently low. Plugging Q = 1 into the social welfare function, we get W p≤τ −a = ν + p (λν − c) So provided c < λν, social welfare is strictly increasing in p for p ≤ τ − a. The tax authority's equilibrium choice of p will therefore not be lower than τ − a provided c < λν. We also see that if c > λν, social welfare strictly decreases in p, so that the optimal policy is not to audit at all, or p * = 0, proving part b) of Proposition 2.
Third, suppose p ∈ (τ − a, τ + a).
From (5), we know this implies Q = τ −p+a 2a
∈ (0, 1). Using this expression in the social welfare function, one obtains W p∈(τ −a,τ +a) = ν − (1 − ν) c p + ν τ − p + a 2a
Social welfare is concave in p if c < λ, which is implied by c < λν since ν ∈ [0, 1]. So the firstorder condition given by (6) above defines a unique social welfare maximum, which, solving (6) for p, is found at p * = (νλ − (2 − ν) c) a + ν τ (2λ − c) 2 ν (λ − c) .
Let us now proceed to analyzing for which values of heterogeneity a the interior solution p * is indeed optimal. That is, we need to show when p * ∈ (τ − a, τ + a) holds.
First, consider p * < τ + a.
Plugging in the expression for p * above, the inequality p * < τ + a is equivalent to
Now, let us distinguish two cases. a) Suppose ν ≤ This provides a necessary and sufficient condition on a for the interior solution p * to be optimal indeed, namely that the extent of heterogeneity a is large enough.
Second, consider p * > τ − a.
The inequality p * > τ − a is equivalent to ( 3νλ − (2 + ν) c ) a > −νcτ which is satisfied if 3νλ − (2 + ν)c > 0 or equivalently, c < 3νλ 2 + ν But since 2 + ν < 3, our initial assumption of c < νλ ensures that we always have c < 3νλ 2+ν . It follows that p * > τ − a is implied by c < νλ.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 2.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3
We begin with part a), supposing a < a L .
From Proposition 2, we know that p * = τ + a when a < a L . This implies full compliance, or Q = 0. Social welfare is thus given by
And it is seen immediately that ∂Wa<a L ∂a < 0, i.e. social welfare is decreasing in the extent of heterogeneity a for a < a L .
Next, consider part b), supposing a > a L .
As indicated in the proposition, two cases require distinction. which is always satisfied since ν ∈ (0, 1). This concludes the argument for small audit cost.
Second, suppose c > ν 2−ν λ.
As before, applying the envelope theorem yields the change in equilibrium social welfare with respect to heterogeneity as
Since c > The last step of the argument is to show that a L < a H . We have a L = ντ c νλ − (3ν − 2)c < ντ c (2 − ν)c − νλ = a H Rearraning, this inequality is equivalent to νλ − (3ν − 2)c > (2 − ν)c − νλ c < λ which always holds due to our assumption that c < νλ and the fact that ν ∈ (0, 1).
This concludes the proof of Proposition 3.
